Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Banking competition not only impacts banks' performance, but also affects the real sector (Carbó, et al, 2009) , economic growth (Collender and Shaffer, 2003) , financial system stability (Cihak, et.al, 2006) and monetary policy effectiveness launched by the central bank (De Jonghe and Vennet, 2008) . Competition in the banking industry drives bank loan interest rate which is a major real sector investment driver and affect private consumption. Investment and consumption are important determinant of a country's economic growth. Central bank monetary policy transmission also can take place smoothly and in a relatively short time lag if banking competition is quite tight. More tighter competition among banks, the faster banks response to the benchmark interest rate changes and other monetary policy released by central banks so that both monetary policy and fiscal policy can be an effective policy and mutually supportive.
The simplest industry competition measurement is the Concentration Ratio which is the percentage of revenues, profits or third party funds in the banking sector dominated by several large banks. For example, Revenue CR3 is the concentration ratio which indicates the percentage of three biggest companies in the industry total revenue to total industry revenue, while CR5 shows the dominance of the five largest banks in the banking industry. Some experts claim that the Concentration Ratio can result an erroneous conclusion about industry competition level because it ignores the distribution of market share among all the companies that exist in an industry (e.g Apergis, et.al, (2016) ; Berger, et.al (2004) ). A industry with high CR3 does not necessarily mean low industry competition because competition among the rest of companies (all companies excluding the three biggest companies) may be very tight. Signifikan Vol. 6 (1), April 2017 Industry concentration is actually a proxy variable that was widely used by researchers to measure industry level of competition. Some empirical research show the concentration ratio of banking industry does not accurately reflect competition of the banking industry (Berger, et al. (2004) ; Claessens and Laeven (2004) ). When an industry concentration is high, it does not necessarily mean low competition level.
On the other hand low concentration does not necessarily mean a very tight competition also. This empirical measurement problem encourages researchers to develop more reliable empirical competition level measurement method (Bikker, et.al (2012) ; Maudos and Solis (2011) .
To obtain a robust measure of banking industry competition, this paper uses three competition measurements which currently are getting wide acceptance in academic community and among practitioners also. These three competition measures came from the New Empirical Industrial Organization stream of research which proposed methodologies of competition measurement with a solid economics foundation. These three competition measurement are Boone indicator, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse H-statistics. Each measurement provides a sligthly different information of the existing competition in an industry, eventhough they has a similar approach to measure how intense the competition is. All these competition measures lay their argument on microeconomics theory of market behavior, how market power obtained by a producer drives his behavior in setting up price of his product or services. However each indicator reflects different aspect of the competition (Degryse et al., 2009 ). Boone (2008) built a banking competition indicator based on a basic idea that the efficient firms will benefit more in a competitive market. More efficient the company, more superior their performance compared to competitors so they can accumulate greater profits than their rival. When competition becomes tighter, efficient firms can exploit their cost superiority to be an effective tool to grasp bigger market size and profit. Boone indicator as a measure of competition has been quite widely used in banking research (eg Delis, 2012; Tabak et al., 2012; Schaeck, et.al, 2013 Schaeck, et.al (2010) .
Boone indicator has two advantages. Firstly, Boone Indicator has very strong theoretical basis. Boone Indicator is built on solid microeconomics theory and based on two assumptions: restricted entry barriers and the aggressiveness of existing companies in an industry. Secondly, Boone indicator can capture both the dynamics of competition and non-price strategy in the market compared to other competition measures which are only based on price competition and static state of competition (Schaeck, et.al (2010) ). However, Boone indicator has a weakness, because of its emphasis on the dynamics of competition, it assumes firms are always able to immediately transform benefits from the efficiency advantages into a higher income and profit. Though in the short term usually benefits from such efficiencies are not always evident in earnings or profit, but they can produce other performance superiority such as consumer satisfaction and loyalty or bigger market shares (Leon, 2015) .
To get a comprehensive banking competition measures, this study also uses two non-structural competition measurements besides Boone Indicator, Lerner index and H Statistic Panzar-Rosse. Lerner index measures each bank's degree of competitiveness. Lerner Index measures bank ability to keep its product prices always above marginal cost. The marginal cost of each bank is obtained by estimating the bank cost function with three input factors, which are the cost of labor, physical capital costs, and cost of funds. Boone (2008) shows the Lerner index at the country level consistently produced over estimated competition level because it is affected by how aggressive existing companies behave and bank margin costs are also sensitive to macroeconomic conditions (Carbó et al., 2009 Panzar and Rosse (1987) developed a competition measurement model by estimating how much the difference of average price set up by existing companies in the industry compared to the pricing strategy of a perfectly competitive market (Bikker, et.al, 2012) . The company's response to changes of input prices and how they transform it into product price depend on the competitive behavior of all market participants in the industry. Competition level is measured by examining how strong the effect of input price changes are reflected in the companies' revenue equilibrium. In a perfect competition market, for example, changes of input prices can not be transferred into higher selling prices because all sellers and producers simply are price takers. The company's revenues are very influenced by changes in production input prices in such market where declining input prices will encourage producers to increase the number of output in some extent to capture the opportunity to gain higher profit. Declining input prices drive a increase of total revenue in same proportion. Conversely when input prices rise, the total income of the company will decrease proportionally also because the average company will reduce the amount of output so that total revenue will decrease proportionately. The relationship between input prices with the company's revenues becomes very elastic (unity elasticity). (Apergis, et.al, 2016) . In monopolistic competition, companies compete with each other but each company has a specific product and market segments which are quite separately so that the increase of input prices can partly be transferred into price increases, and total output does not drop too much. Demand is not too sensitive to the increase of selling prices in monopolistic competition because every market segments are loyal to a specific bank or, in other words, every bank has relatively strong market power in the market segments it serves. If regression coefficients in Panzar-Rosse model is between zero and one, which is an indication of monopolistic competition market, then it indicates an increase in input prices led total revenue to rise but revenue increase percentage is lower than the input price increase percentage. On the other hand, if input prices decrease, total revenue does not decrease because input prices does not lead to lower price. In monopolistic competition market, lower selling price does not necessarily induce higher total demand in each bank's market segment.
Meanwhile, selling price of other companies also do not affect this market segments demand. Bank tend to play a non price strategy in the monopolistic competition market. Bikker and Haaf (2000) examined competition of the banking sectors in the 23 countries using Panzar-Rosse (1987) Signifikan Vol. 6 (1), April 2017 specific market segments compared to larger banks. Large banks and medium banks both generally served almost same market segments so that the competition among large and medium banks became relatively far more stringent than competition among small banks. Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) with greater data consist of banking sectors from 101 countries, also using Panzar-Rosse approach, find majority of banking competitions in the world can be classified as a monopolistic competition market.
European banking competition level has decreased significantly. But on the other hand, banking industry in developing countries have a tendency to become more competitive.
The relationship between banking competition, efficiency and profitability is still a topic of academic debate. Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) stated that the competition encourages banks to minimize costs so that it can sell services at a cheaper price and make higher profit. Banks which are efficiently managed will beat inefficient banks and are able to foster consistent profits so that its assets and its market share continues to grow. The concentration of the industry would be even higher in the banking industry with a high degree of competition (De Jonghe and Vennet, 2008 ). Contrary, low competition level will drive bank managers enjoy what is called as a "quiet life" where operational cost is not adequately controlled and efficiency levels are low but profitability remains at high level persistently (Dietrich and Wanzenreid, 2011; Berger and Hannan, 1998) , Chen and Liao (2011) construct a theoretical model that show banks at a competitive banking sector will be encouraged to have a better procedure for selecting and monitoring customers, so bad loans tend to be relatively lower. Customers who have a better risk profile will select bank which owns best selection and monitoring procedures because these bank are able to distinguish and measure the credit risk of each customer accurately so that the pricing of bank loans is based on accurate each customer's risk level. Customers with large credit risk tend to avoid to propose a loan to this type of bank and prefer banks which have weaker and relatively inaccurate credit assessment procedure so there is a opportunity to obtain more favorable credit pricing due to bank's negligence. As a result, banks which have better procedures for selecting customer and better credit risk assessment will have better portfolio of credit, lower non performing loan, and better cost efficiency than banks which do not Some experts have hypothesized relationship between competition and efficiency of the banking industry in opposing position from above hypothesis.
Competition actually drives to lower bank efficiency. They argue that high competition will cause fragile and short term-minded customer-bank relation (Maudos and Solis, 2011) . Customers tend to easily switch to another bank in an intense banking competition. Bank's credit market becomes a highly asymmetric information market so bank requires an additional costs to attract customers, to monitor a loan and to educate customers. Bank's total cost will increase and eventually be transferred into higher interest rate and service fees. This argument underlies the alleged negative 
Measurement Method
To measure the concentration of banking industry, this study uses two measures: concentration ratio and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Concentration Ratio is estimated with following formula:
where CR is Concentration Ratio, s i is each bank's market share, k is number of bank which operated in given period. Bank's market share is a ratio between bank's total asset and total asset of banking industry (Bikker dan Spierdijk, 2008) . For robustness test, Concentration ratio, besides in bank's total asset value, were also measured in two different aspects: market share in credit market and third party deposits.
This study also uses two type of Concentration ratio, CR3 and CR5, which show market domination by three largest bank and fifth largest bank subsequently. High However, Concentration Ratio may produce an erroneous conclusions because it only measures the market share of the three (CR3) or five (CR5) largest companies in the industry and ignores how market share are distributed among the rest of banks that exist in the industry. Even distribution of the market share between the most biggest bank that are included in the three or the five biggest in CR3 dan CR5 can not be captured by concentration ratios. For an example, in a country its largest bank grasps 40% market share, while the two other largest companies both own 10% of the shares.
On the other hand, another country which has three largest banks that each control 20% market share. Those two countries will have the same concentration ratio, CR3
will be exactly same, namely 60%. To overcome this disadvantages of the concentration ratio, the author used also another banking industry concentration measure: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). HHI is calculated by using all market share of each bank in a country To measure banking competition, the study uses three approaches which are Boone Indicator, Lerner Index and Panzar-Rosse which were used by previous researchers such as Leon (2015) , Anginer et al, 2012) , Bikker, et.al (2012) , and Samad Signifikan Vol. 6 (1), April 2017 assumes that the bank has three inputs in bank production process which are labor, deposits, and infrastructures. The price of bank production factors are: Average Funding Rate (AFR), the ratio of interest expense to total third party funds, Price of Personeel Expenses (PPE), which is the ratio of labor costs to total assets, and Price of Capital expenditure (PCE), which is the ratio of the physical assets cost and other expenditures cost on fixed assets. Banking competition level measures produced by Panzar-Rosse approach is H statistics which is the sum of the three regression coefficients in the regression of bank revenue on three inputs prices of the bank production process. Besides bank input prices, reliable model should include some control variables. These control variables have a significant influence on bank revenues.
These control variables usually called as Bank Specific Factors (BSF) such as bank size, bank capital structure, and bank risk.
First Bank Specific Factor is bank's total assets which is a proxy measure of bank's economic scales. Although there is still a debate in banking research literature whether larger bank is more likely to become an efficient bank, but almost all researchers agree that the size of the bank greatly affect the level of bank income (Barbosa, et.al 2015) . The second control variable is the bank capital adequacy which can be captured through the ratio of total equity to total assets. Shaffer (2004) shows the capital ratios significantly affect bank's risk taking and bank's profitability. The structure of bank funding which is reflected in the ratio of total debt to total assets also determine the level of bank profitability. The greater proportion of bank loans in bank fundings, the bank will be more willing to take risk so that the profitability of banks will be higher, but on the other hand bank's risk level increases. Liquidity risk which is reflected in the bank cash ratio, total cash to total deposits, is a control variable used to control risk level in bank revenues. The last control variables is the proportion of bank's o ther income in its total income.
Log-normal function reduced form model of bank revenue which is used to calculate Panzar-Rosse H statistic as a measure of banking industry competition level is: Where Revenue: logarithm of bank's total revenues, AFR = interest expense to total deposits ratio, PPE= Personeel expense to total employees, PCE = administrative and operational expenses to total asset, EQ = total equity to total asset, LO = New loan to total loan ratio, CASH = total cash to total deposits ratio.
Panzar-Rosse H statistics is calculated by formula:
We get β, γ, and δ by estimating model (3) for yearly data so we can get yearly banking competition level in each country. To classify banking competition level based on Panzar Rosse H statistic, Table1 shows the criteria. Source: Leon (2015) Wald Test is used to test whether the amount of H statistics generated from the estimated model is in between two extremes of the competition level spectrum which are monopoly and perfect competition. The Wald test has null hypothesis that can be tested separately i.e whether β + γ + δ = 0 which means the competition is monopoly / oligopoly, or β + γ + δ = 1 which means the competition are perfectly 
MC is marginal cost of bank i.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Indonesia banking industry concentration is quite high, although consistently show a declining trend. Table 2 show Indonesia banking industry concentration trend. In terms of assets, more than half of Indonesia's banking assets still controlled only by the five major banks (CR5). Indonesia banking industry consolidation after the 1998 monetary crisis had made many Indonesia small and medium banks to be insolvent, liquidated, acquired by another bank or merged. It drove a merger wave in Indonesia banking industry and domestic bank acquisition by foreign bank. A year after the crisis, 1999, total Indonesia banking asset owned by five biggest banks were even more than 70%. Indonesia Banking Architecture policy which was launched by Bank Indonesia also effectively increased the assets of small banks and the medium so percentage of the Indonesian banking assets owned by the three largest banks, CR3, was declining in faster pace than CR5 was . If in 1999, Indonesia CR3 of the asset was above 60%, in 2013 it had dropped to half of it which is an indication that the asset growth of the three largest banks are not as fast as the growth of industrial assets on average. Distribution of Indonesian banking assets become relatively more evenly distributed, however CR5 which is still above 50%, consistently show the declining trend. Small and medium bank, which consist of more than 110 banks, control 50% market share. Half of indonesia banking industry was controlled only by the five largest banks. Indonesia bank loans concentration ratios (Loan CR5) are lower than the asset concentration (Asset CR5) and Deposit concentration (Deposit CR5). This is an indication that big banks' loan market were under its asset dominance in the industry.
Indonesia big banks' loan disbursement were relatively less aggressive compared to medium and small banks. Competition in Indonesia credit markets was relatively less concentrated compared to competition in the deposit market that is indicated by Loan CR3 and Loan CR5 which was consistently lower than Deposit CR3 and Deposit CR5. The intermediary function of the major banks have not fully carried out optimally, collected third party funds had not been fully disbursed in the form of loant to the real sector. On contrary position, small and medium-sized banks were able to channel more loans than collected third party funds so they used outside funding sources by issuing bonds. we may conclude that Indonesia banking industry was relatively less concentrated than neighboring countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines as presented in Table 3 .
Indonesia banking industry concentration, Asset CR3 and CR5, were far below Asset CR3 and CR5 of Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, means market share and dominance of major banks in Indonesia were lower compared to neighbouring countries. But it does not mean Indonesia banking industry competition level is higher compared to those three neighboring countries. We may come to this conclusion if *significant at 10% level of error, ** significant at 5% level of error, *** significant at 1% level of error. Strict segmentation allegedly caused a monopolistic competition in Indonesian banking industry. Indonesia banks tried to look for particular market segments, and focus on serving a specific market segment so each bank may have a strong position their own market segment. A bank may dominate a certain segments and behaves like a monopoly. Banks and its customers has a quite long and loyal relation and bank competition is more directed at non-price competition. Small firms and retirees segment, is a market niche with a higher interest rate than other customer segments, few banks focus on these segment and have stronghold. A high standard of deviation of Indonesia banks' prime lending rate is a strong indication of non-price competition and segmented banking market. Signifikan Vol. 6 (1), April 2017 level of banking competition because concentration ratio of the three countries, as can be seen in Table 5 , are lower than Indonesia concentration ratio. This conclusion is supported by the estimated banking competition by using other measure such as the Lerner Index and Boone Indicator which will be discussed in following section. Indonesian banking competition is relatively less stringent compared to Malaysia, Thailand and the Phillipines. To obtain estimated banking competition level by using the Lerner Index and Boone Indicator, we need to estimate banks' cost function.
The estimated cost function is presented in Table 6 . All variables in the cost equation bank are statistically significant. Then we can estimate bank marginal cost in Table 6 . (5) and (6) above. Lerner Index estimation results confirm the Panzar-Rosse H statistic which has been presented, Indonesia banking industry competitions level were lower than its neighbouring countries. usually benefits from such efficiencies has not been reflected in earnings yet (Leon, 2015) . Signifikan Vol. 6 (1), April 2017 Banking competition level and bank profibability shows an inverse relationship, but on the other hand competition did not affect significantly banks' efficiency. This empirical result are reflected in very large negative correlation coefficient between all concentration and banking competition level measurement, except for Boone Indicator, and bank profitability. Meanwhile correlation coefficient between concentration and banking competition and bank efficiency are positive but relatively low. These two contradicting phenomenon reinforce an indication of non-price competition in the Indonesian banking market which Indonesia tend to serve a specific market segment so predominantly competition was closed to monopolistic competition market. The level of competition affected profitability due to Indonesia bank were able to transform market power into a higher profit by raising its product prices without making its customers to switch to another bank that offers a lower interest rate. Banking competitive strategies were not based on price, but through other bank product features which are costly and caused lower efficiency. The results support Berger, et al. (2004) ; Claessens and Laeven (2004) that argue concentration ratio may produce wrong indication of industry competition level.
The concentration ratio can not capture banking industry competition in Indonesia and the ASEAN countries. These findings may conclude that industry concentration measures are not an appropriate proxy for competition level.
Banking competition levels are also mutually confirming in four observed ASEAN countries, in particular between Lerner Index and H Statistic Panzar Rosse.
Boone Indicator generates a slightly different conclusion compared to the Lerner Index and H statistic Panzar Rosse. However, Boone Indicator of these ASEAN countries were only different in slightly absolute number. This is presumably because of the character of Boone Indicator which has a basic assumption that the level of efficiency of each bank in the short term always can be transform into profit (Leon, 2015) . These finding are inline with previous studies such as Tabak et al., (2012) and Schaeck, et.al (2013) . It may cause Indonesia banking industry consist of many small banks compared to its neighbouring countries. Competition is more complex to be captured by concentration ratio or market dominance by some big banks. Especially in highly monopolistic competition industry, every bank has a significant market power over their respective market segments.
Every bank competed each other but the competition type was a non-price competition Indonesia banking competition level, by using H statistic Panzar-Rosse and the Lerner Index as a competition measure, were a monopolistic competition types.
Indonesia banking industry competition level was the lowest compared to its ASEAN neighbors. Low competition level may be indicated from the high lending rate of Indonesian banks than those in the ASEAN countries. Standard deviation of Indonesia banks' prime lending rate were the highest in the region. Higher dispersion of prime lending rate among Indonesia banks were a strong indication that Indonesia banks tend to have a high market power so they can set up very different pricing strategy for different market segment. Minimal role of corporate bond market and the stock market as a source of financing in Indonesia may drive stronger position of banking industry to transform their market power into higher profitability compared to neighboring countries.
Indication of competition monopolistic in Indonesia banking industry is reinforced by strong negative correlation between Indonesia banking competition and average profitability of banks. More intense competition encouraged banks to seek a specific market segments and to be more innovative in terms of products and services so that the portfolio of products and services created high customer loyalty. Stronger market power over their market power gave Indonesia banks a privilege to launch a premium pricing strategy, so even banking competition become tighter, almost all of banks still has recorded a relatively. Later conclusion is also reinforced by low positive correlation between the banking competition and bank efficiency. Combination of strong market power, highly segmented market, and relatively high customer loyalty made Indonesia bank to be less motivated to compete through better efficiency and lower prices. Indonesia banks' competitive strategy were close to a non price competition type.
